To successfully coordinate natural disaster relief, society must solve Hayek's "knowledge problem" at three critical information nodes: (1) identification of disaster; (2) determination of what relief is needed and who needs which relief resources; and (3) evaluation of on-going relief efforts. This paper investigates the comparative ability of government and the private sector to do this. We find that government is inherently incapable of generating the information needed to solve the knowledge problem at any of these nodes. In contrast, the private sector is capable of solving the knowledge problem at each information node. The results of our analysis suggest that disaster relief reforms which leave government as the primary manager of natural disasters are bound to fail. Correcting government's information failure in the context of disaster relief requires eliminating its root cause: government itself.
Introduction
More than 60 years ago, in his seminal article, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945) , Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek identified the problem of social coordination:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate 'given' resources-if 'given' is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data.' It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only those individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality (1945, (519) (520) ).
Hayek's critical insight, latter called "the knowledge problem," highlighted two central features of social organization. First, every society confronts a "division of knowledge" analogous in many respects to the "division of labor." Information is fragmented, diverse, and often contained in inarticulate forms, held separately and locally by the many individuals who compose society. Second, the foremost obstacle that every effort at social coordination must overcome is somehow tapping into this dispersed information and processing it in forms that individuals can use to mutually achieve their ends.
This article investigates the issue of natural disaster management using Hayek's key insight about the fundamental "knowledge problem" that all efforts to coordinate social activity must solve. We argue that natural disaster management is no different in this regard than coordinating individuals in "normal" economic contexts. Following a natural disaster there are "relief demanders"-individuals who desperately need disaster-relief supplies, including evacuation, food, shelter, medical attention, etc. On the other side, there are "relief suppliers"-individuals ready and willing to bring their supplies and expertise to bear on the needs of relief demanders. On both sides of this "market," information is decentralized, local, and often inarticulate. Relief demanders know when relief is needed, what they need, and in what quantities, but not necessarily who has the relief supplies they require or how to obtain them. Similarly, relief suppliers know what relief supplies they have and how they can help, but may be largely unaware of whether relief is required, and if it is, what is needed, by whom, and in what locations and quantities.
We argue that effective natural disaster relief management, just like successful social coordination in "normal" circumstances, must solve Hayek's knowledge problem.
Specifically, effective disaster management requires efficient information generation at each of three critical nodes, which represent distinct stages in the management and provision of natural disaster relief. The first is the recognition stage; has disaster occurred, how severe is it, and is relief needed? The second is the needs assessment and Hayek suggested a solution to the knowledge problem in the context of economic decision-making generally. Given information's decentralized nature and importance for achieving social coordination, he concluded the importance of allowing decentralized private sector actors, such as those participating in markets, to direct the bulk of economic decision making. Unlike markets, central planning, Hayek argued, has no way of tapping into this information in a productive way:
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization (1945, 524 The arguments in this paper build upon and extend discussions in Leeson (2006a, 2006b ).
crucial to coordinating suppliers and demanders, provide important general lessons about disaster relief management.
Information Node One: What Disaster?
Information fundamentally depends on the institutional context in which it is created. All institutional contexts create some kind of information. But very few generate the kind needed to coordinate spatially and temporally separated suppliers and demanders. In the context of disaster relief, the first piece of critical information that arises involves determining when in fact a disaster has occurred and thus that relief assistance is needed.
Information about the occurrence of a disaster and the need for disaster relief might seem straightforward. However, when disaster relief management is politically centralized, it is often not. Perhaps surprisingly, the vast majority of disasters declared over the last decade have been for weather events that most people would not consider disasters at all, such as severe thunderstorms, wind, and snow (Garrett and Sobel 2003) .
On the other hand, some seemingly major disasters have gone undeclared. The disaster declaration process is clearly more complex and subjective than it first appears.
When disaster relief is centralized and managed by government it necessarily becomes bureaucratized. Government agencies like FEMA are created to oversee and administer relief. These agencies are in turn overseen by other government agencies, each with their own internal bureaucracies, and so on. Following organizational changes after 9/11, for example, FEMA was placed under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, adding new political decision makers to the mix. The layers of bureaucracy ultimately end at some key administrative figure, which in the case of disaster relief is the president, who must declare a disaster before FEMA can act. At each level of the bureaucratic process is a key political decision maker who must sign off before the proposed action can be considered at the next layer of bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy is a necessary and unavoidable outgrowth of state-run activities. It is necessary because unlike private firms, the activities of which are directed by profit seeking, government agencies have no such guide to direct their decision making (Mises 1944 For government agencies, however, things are different. They cannot make do with one rule for their "political managers." Since government agencies do not aim at making profits and, as we discuss below, they do not sell anything, they are unable to use profits or losses to direct managers' activities and to ensure that managers are contributing to the agency's goal. Absent this, some other guide for manager decisions and mechanism for checking the behavior of political agents must be employed. As
Tullock puts it, in the absence of the profit and loss system to measure and ensure that political managers undertake activities that contribute to their agency's goal, "The central problem . . . is organizing subordinate politicians so that they, to the greatest degree possible, will behave as their superiors want them to behave (2005, 132) . This political mechanism for achieving this is bureaucracy. Detailed procedures and protocols must be used in lieu of the profit objective to guide and check political managers' behavior.
Although bureaucracy is inherent and essential to government agencies for this purpose, it does not follow that all of its effects are positive. Detailed protocols that involve multiple layers of approval before action may be undertaken prevent political agents from engaging in activities at odds with the ends of the agency, but also substantially slow government activities and information revelation. In the case of natural disaster declaration, for example, from government's perspective, information that a disaster requiring relief attention has occurred does not emerge until the protocol for disaster declaration described above has been carried to its conclusion.
From the view of political actors charged with relieving disaster, there is no disaster to respond to until the president, who is reached in the final stage of the bureaucratic procedure, has officially declared as much. This is true even if a disaster requiring assistance has already struck, the disaster is readily acknowledged and visible in the media, etc. Unavoidable bureaucracy inherent to government management creates a separation between what might be called "private knowledge" of disaster and "political knowledge" of the same disaster.
This bureaucracy-created "knowledge wedge" severely limits the goals that can be successfully achieved using government. According to Tullock, "These limits, it should be emphasized, are limits on what can be done, not on the size of the bureaucracies that can be built. Furthermore, these limits are much lower if the task to be accomplished requires a high degree of coordination than if it does not" (2005, 170) . The more monumental the task in terms of coordination, the greater the problem the knowledge wedge that bureaucracy generates becomes, and thus the less likely government is to effectively complete the task.
The bureaucracy-created "knowledge wedge" explains why, though the citizens of New Orleans, the media, and countless others were aware of the impending and eventual disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina, key government relief management figures, it appears, were not-or at least did not officially acknowledge that this was the case.
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, for example, did not declare Hurricane Katrina an "incident of national significance" until 36 hours after it made landfall. This occurred despite the fact on August 27th-two days before Katrina's arrival-the National Hurricane Center predicted Katrina would hit the Gulf Coast (Landay, Young, and McCaffrey 2005) .
Government was also painfully unaware of major and fundamental developments in the relief process following Katrina's arrival. FEMA director, Michael Brown, for instance, only became aware that hurricane victims in New Orleans had been moved to one of the city's convention centers after being informed of this fact by a television journalist. On Nightline, Brown admitted, "We just learned of the Convention Centerwe being the federal government-today" (quoted in Susman 2005).
Predictably, but perhaps ironically, the real success stories in the relief effort therefore came from those who ignored FEMA, flouted the bureaucratic decision-making process, and took action without approval. Further, private actors have a much greater incentive to learn about the potential for a disaster in the first place. The first business to a disaster area with provisions for victims stands to benefit handsomely from beating others to the disaster zone. Even private non-profit organizations have a strong incentive to identify disasters quickly. The faster they are on location to help those in need, the more likely are potential charitable contributors to give additional money to their organization.
In markets, the ability of consumers to "exit" and take their business (or charitable donations) elsewhere is king. When a private non-profit agency fails to respond, its future donations suffer. When a private for-profit firm fails to respond, it loses profit. In government, on the other hand, this incentive simply does not exist. FEMA will continue to use coercive taxation to finance its activities regardless of its performance in any specific relief effort. There is no exit option for taxpayers. Within government, the "voice" option of negative media publicity and lost votes for incumbent politicians are the only incentives; there is no threat of going out of business.
Information Node Two: What's Needed and Who Needs it?
After identifying a disaster, the most important issues of information regard the identification of "what's needed," "who needs it?," and "who has the means to meet these needs?" Some disaster victims need water, others need shelter, and still others need food.
Are the needs in different geographic areas different? It is likely that all disaster victims will require basic necessities, but the extent to which different individuals need these things will vary. Further, not all disaster victims will need these items as critically as others. In addition there will be many instances of specific areas needing specific help, such as rooftop rescues or massive bus evacuations, which are unique and unexpected.
Finally, individuals have specialized resources only they know can solve the diverse problems that emerge following a disaster.
Consider first how private sector participants come to discover this information.
In the marketplace, the interactions of suppliers and demanders generate market prices for various goods and services. As Hayek pointed out, these prices convey information about localized supply and demand conditions, indicating to suppliers where supplies are needed most and communicating to demanders when they may expand consumption (because supplies have become more abundant relative to demand) or curtail consumption (because supplies have become less abundant relative to demand).
Even the charitable activities of private individuals and non-profit organizations, which suffer somewhat from the absence of market prices to guide them, are likely to be directed toward satisfying the most highly valued needs. Individuals making donations have an incentive and desire to make sure their donations are used effectively, and an incentive to search out information as to the best use of their donated resources. Non-profit organizations who are not careful stewards of their donated resources soon find they have fewer donations to allocate. For-profit firms that choose to be charitable are careful to allocate their resources in a way that generates value because this generates the highest return to the firm in terms of reputation, and thus future profits. This is how private sector suppliers of disaster relief essentials, such as Wal-Mart, were able to quickly bring necessities like water to bear on the plight of Katrina victims who had been hit the hardest. While FEMA was still busy trying to distinguish between its head and its tail, Wal-Mart was already back in business, providing the items rescue workers and victims needed, in the right quantities, at their everyday low prices, and sometimes even for free. Wal-Mart, which has donated more than $20 million to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, supplied the essential items hurricane victims and disaster relief providers needed. "Over $3 million in supplies were given directly to shelters, providing a lifeline for stranded residents" (Higgins 2005 ). This included chain saws and boots, sheets and clothes, and water and ice (Tierney 2005) . As one hurricane victim put it, Wal-Mart "was the only place we could find water in those first days . . . I still haven't managed to get through to FEMA. It's hard to say, but you get more justice at Wal-Mart" (quoted in Tierney 2005) . Wal-Mart's amazing capacity to bring the needed supplies to bear on the atrocity created by Hurricane Katrina has had even its staunchest critics praising the company (Higgins 2005 In the first week of relief activities alone, FEMA refused to ship trailers to Mississippi that could be used as temporary housing for disaster victims, turned away critical generators needed by hospitals and victims for power, turned away trucks with water demanded by many, prevented the coastguard from delivering fuel critical to facilitating recovery activities, and refused Amtrak's offer to evacuate victims who desperately needed to get out the disaster zone (Democratic National Committee 2005).
The last Amtrak train left New Orleans empty (Parker 2005). Even the American Bus
Association, representing Greyhound Bus Lines, offered to help FEMA evacuate the Superdome and Convention Center. However, like so many others who offered their assistance, the American Bus Association's offers fell on deaf ears, and they were never even able to even get a reply or response from FEMA officials (Martin and Zajac 2005 (Roane 2005) .
A similar situation prevailed in the case of 1000 firefighters who believed that their much-needed efforts would be put to actually helping hurricane victims. Instead, they were sent to a hotel in Atlanta, forced to take days of sexual harassment courses, and 
Information Node Three: Is What We're Doing Working?
After establishing if a disaster has occurred, determining what is needed and who needs it, and taking action to remedy the situation, the final piece of critical information needed for effective disaster relief management is feedback on whether or not the plan of action being pursued is actually working. In other words, are disaster victims getting what they need? Or are disaster relief efforts failing to provide for disaster victims? To appreciate government's inability to generate this feedback information, it is again useful to contrast this with the private sector.
In markets, the profit and loss mechanism informs suppliers whether or not they are satisfying the needs of demanders. Those who are, earn profits, which reward them with greater command over resources in the economy. Those who are not are punished with losses, and lose control over these resources. Profits and losses communicate to suppliers whether or not their activities are desirable to demanders, whether they should expand output, or alter their activities (Mises 1949) . In the context of relief management, profits and losses tell private providers of disaster relief essentials like water, food, shelter and even private protection against criminals, whether or not they are effectively fulfilling the needs of disaster victims.
Consider, for example, the numerous private security agencies that protected the property of residents and business owners. These private firms emerged to satisfy an unmet demand for property rights protection created by government's failure to perform this task in the wake of the disaster. In Louisiana alone, within 14 days of Katrina's landfall, the number private security firms climbed from 185 to 235 (Scahill 2005) . The growing numbers of security firms offering their services to disaster victims reflected the growing profitability of providing this service, which in turn reflected consumers' satisfaction with these services and their demand for additional protection.
Private non-profit organizations confront a similar feedback mechanism because they rely on voluntary donations. The non-profits who create the most value for those they help garner more donations, while those who squander their resources suffer lower future donations. While this feedback is not as strong as the pure profit and loss mechanism, it remains stronger than for government, which finances its activities through coercive taxation. Lily Duke, for instance, an independent film producer with no previous relief experience, arrived in New Orleans with a single truckload of donated food. Because of her effectiveness in supplying aid to Katrina victims, donations to her operation increased exponentially. Within three months following the disaster, Duke was operating three distribution centers that served 20,000 people a day (Seewer 2005) .
Because the resources under government's control are not primarily based on performance, government lacks an effective feedback mechanism. Consequently, political actors have very little idea about whether or not they should expand their activities, shift their activities, or drop them altogether. Political actors know only the costs of their activities. But they have no information in the form of feedback about the desirability of them (Mises 1944) . This makes economically allocating resources and coordinating the supply of these resources with those who desire them through the political process exceedingly difficult, if not outright impossible.
When it comes to disaster relief management, this can be a serious problem. A striking example of this in the case of Katrina is the case of temporary housing provision.
Following the hurricane, cruise lines, such as Carnival, immediately offered their cruise ships for rent to house relief workers. Their profit from this activity depended on whether these ships were stationed in areas where they were needed most. As a result, they stationed ships in those places that benefited hurricanes victims the most. FEMA, on the other hand set up trailer parks that in many cases went virtually unused. It faced neither profits nor losses from its decision about where to locate temporary housing.
Consequently, trailers were deployed where they weren't needed, at an astonishing cost to taxpayers. We have discussed how markets create this information and the incentives to act upon it, and how government-by its nature-cannot create either. This realization has radical implications for disaster management policy. Namely, government must be removed from disaster management to the same extent that it is removed from all other successful market activities. Concretely, this means that government's near-monopoly control on disaster relief and role as a centralized "clearinghouse" of relief activities must be relinquished for disaster management to be effective. Tinkering with government disaster management at the margins is no more likely to make government disaster relief effective than tinkering with the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy was likely to improve its effectiveness.
In government's place, the market should be allowed to coordinate relief activities, as it did to a limited extent because of government restrictions following Hurricane Katrina. Despite government-erected hurdles, private for-profit and non-profit actors were remarkably successful in relieving the victims of Katrina, especially in those areas such as New Orleans that were hit hardest by the hurricane. The private sector proved itself capable, as it does under "normal" circumstances, of generating the relevant information at each of the critical nodes of disaster response. The public sector, in contrast, also like under "normal" circumstances, did not.
Our finding that an inability to overcome the information problem is the root cause of government's failure to effectively manage natural disaster relief casts doubt on recent explanations of FEMA's failure following Hurricane Katrina. One strand of argument, for example, suggests that an unfortunate succession of "bad directors,"
culminating in the leadership of former FEMA director Michael Brown, is the reason for this failure. Our analysis suggests that although incompetent directorship may exacerbate government's inability to effectively manage natural disasters, it is of subsidiary importance to Hayek's knowledge problem discussed here. Even the most benevolent and effective of directors cannot overcome this problem, which stems from inherent organization of government management, which is centralized. Thus, optimism for FEMA or other possible agencies of state-provided disaster relief is unwarranted. The "bad directors" argument is analogous to the "bad rulers" argument used by some to explain the failure of the Soviet Union. Here, as in the case of disaster relief, bad leadership does not help, but neither does it explain the core failure of the system.
Replacing Stalin with Mother Theresa or Albert Einstein would have been no more help for the Soviet economy than replacing Michael Brown or the current FEMA director with one of these individuals would be.
Likewise, our discussion casts doubt on the argument that FEMA's recent reorganization under the Department of Homeland Security following 9/11 is responsible for its failure in the Gulf Coast. Again, while it is true that following this reorganization additional resources were channeled to fighting terrorism against, for instance, rebuilding levees, the fundamental issue is why government directed resources to the specific uses it did (a problem of information) instead of in alternative ways given the substantial overlap between ends involved in fighting domestic terrorism and preparing for natural disaster.
A weak levee which, if destroyed, could wipe out an entire region, for example, is both a natural disaster concern and one closely tied to terrorism given such a target's clear vulnerability to terrorist attack. 
